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WE’RE SOARIN’, FLYIN’: THE THIRD CIRCUIT HOLDS TRAVELERS
MAY SUE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OFFICERS IN PELLEGRINO
v. UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DIVISION OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
LAUREN PUGH*
“And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to
suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of
a person’s clothing . . . is not a ‘search.’”1
I. THERE’S NO BREAKIN’ FREE FROM THE TSA: A LOOK INTO
THE PHYSICALITY OF TSA SEARCHES
“Magical,” “enchanting,” and “whimsical;” these are the words one
thinks about when taking an airplane ride to Disney World.2  “Miserable,”
humiliating,” or “appalling,” on the other hand are not.3  While traveling
to Disney World, four-year-old Ryan experienced the latter.4  At the air-
* J.D. Candidate, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A.,
2017 Saint Joseph’s University.  I would like to dedicate this Note to my parents,
Mary and Bill Pugh.  Thank you so much for all the love and support you have
given me throughout my entire life.  I am so lucky to have you as parents.  Also, I
would like to thank the staff of the Villanova Law Review for all the hard work and
helpful feedback throughout the process of publishing this article.  The headings
used throughout this Note were inspired by songs from Disney’s High School
Musical. See HIGH SCHOOL MUSICAL (Walt Disney Records 2006).
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
2. See Magic Kingdom Park, WALT DISNEY WORLD, https://disneyworld.disney
.go.com/destinations/magic-kingdom/ [https://perma.cc/K6K8-8F3N] (last vis-
ited Aug. 23, 2018) (describing Disney World as enchanting place full of live en-
tertainment and family fun); see also Walt Disney World Resort, SOUTHWEST
VACATIONS, https://www.southwestvacations.com/destinations/walt-disney-world-
resort-vacation-packages [https://perma.cc/CHY9-ZSA6] (last visited Sept. 17,
2018) (describing Walt Disney World as the most magical place on Earth).
3. See FOX 35 ORLANDO, TSA, Absolutely Out of Control, Forces Disabled 4YO to
Remove Braces, Walk Through Magnetometer, YOUTUBE (Mar.3, 2010), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=CvNNks_m5bE [https://perma.cc/6AW6-4QCH] (illus-
trating Fox 35 Orlando television newscast describing father of four-year-old dis-
abled boy as appalled when boy was forced to go through security without his leg
braces). But see Magic Kingdom Park, supra note 2 (describing Disney World as “the
most magical place on Earth”).
4. See Daniel Rubin, Daniel Rubin: Another Case of TSA Overkill, THE PHILA. IN-
QUIRER (Feb. 14, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20100215_
Daniel_Rubin__Another_case_of_TSA_overkill.html?arc404=true [https://perma
.cc/9SM4-YP25] (reporting TSO instructed four-year-old Ryan, who is unable to
walk on his own and wears custom made leg braces as result of being born sixteen
weeks premature, to take off his leg braces and walk through metal detector with-
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port, a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) instructed Ryan’s parents to
take off Ryan’s leg braces so he could walk through the metal detector,
despite his inability to walk on his own.5  Unfortunately, Ryan is not alone
in his experience with intrusive TSOs.6  Although Ryan’s parents complied
with the TSO’s instructions by removing his leg braces and decided not to
press charges against the TSO, Ryan may have been victorious in court if
during the search the TSO physically removed Ryan’s leg braces and as-
saulted him in the process because of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit’s decision in Pellegrino v. United States Transportation
Security Administration, Division of Department of Homeland Security.7
5. See id. (reporting that although Ryan’s parents told TSO that Ryan could
not walk on his own, TSO insisted Ryan comply with his demand if he wished to
pass through security).  Ryan’s mother suggested that she help Ryan walk through
the metal detector, but the TSO instructed her that Ryan must walk through the
metal detector by himself. See id. (detailing how Ryan made it through the metal
detectors without falling).  A week after the incident, the airport’s Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) director called Ryan’s parents to apologize for the
incident. See id. (describing how TSA director acknowledged that Ryan should not
have been forced to walk through the metal detector by himself).  Although TSOs
were originally known as TSA “screeners,” the TSA changed the name in October
2005 to “transportation security officer.” See Transportation Security Officers Have Re-
newed Focus and New Look on Seventh Anniversary of 9/11, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. (Sept.
11, 2008), https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2008/09/11/transportation-secur-
ity-officers-have-renewed-focus-and-new-look-seventh [https://perma.cc/YB5A-
4XCH] (describing name change from “screener” to “transportation security
officer”).
6. See, e.g., Melissa Chan, A TSA Agent Pat Down a Boy During a Routine Security
Check.  His Mother is ‘Livid’ over It, TIME (Mar. 28, 2017), http://time.com/
4715428/tsa-pat-down-boy-video-jennifer-williamson-dallas-airport/ [https://per
ma.cc/8TGT-JAZG] (reporting TSO thoroughly patted down thirteen-year-old boy
suffering from sensory processing disorder for about two minutes at Dallas-Fort
Worth International Airport); Petula Dvorak, A Panty Liner Triggers a TSA Pat-Down




that sixty-five-year-old woman, Evelyne Harris, passed through airport scanner at
Baltimore-Washington International Marshall Airport when TSO pulled her aside,
choked her, and groped her private parts); Video of TSA Agents Searching 96-Year-Old
Woman in Wheelchair Sparks Outrage, CBS NEWS (June 8, 2018, 9:11 PM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/tsa-agents-search-96-year-old-woman-wheelchair-dulles-
airport-outside-washington/ [https://perma.cc/EFJ5-25ZK] (reporting video went
viral of TSOs at Dulles Airport in Washington, D.C. intensely patting down ninety-
six-year-old woman in wheelchair).
7. See Rubin, supra note 4 (reporting Ryan’s parents removed his brace and
Ryan went through the security check without falling).  Ryan’s father said he did
not intend to file a lawsuit against the TSOs. See id. (explaining that Ryan’s father
left “terse message” with airport manager but did not want to file lawsuit).  A civil
assault occurs when an actor “acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive con-
tact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension
of such a contact, and . . . the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehen-
sion.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965) (describing elements for
civil assault); Pellegrino v. United States Transp. Sec. Admin, Div. of Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 937 F.3d 164, 168–70 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that United States
2
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An individual who is injured or whose property is damaged by a TSO
may file a complaint or a claim with the Transportation Security Adminis-
tration (TSA).8  If the TSA denies the complaint or fails to resolve the
claim within six months, the individual may file suit in a United States
district court.9  With the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Pellegrino, an
individual injured by a TSO may now have a remedy.10
Generally, the United States cannot be sued in state or federal courts
because it possesses sovereign immunity.11  However, under the law en-
forcement proviso, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the United
States’ sovereign immunity “with regard to acts or omissions of investiga-
tive or law enforcement officers of the United States Government” for any
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse
of process, or malicious prosecution.12  The FTCA defines an “investiga-
tive or law enforcement officer” as “any officer of the United States who is
empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make ar-
rests for violations of Federal law.”13
waived its sovereign immunity when TSOs are sued for assault, battery, false impris-
onment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution).
8. See Claims, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/passenger-sup-
port/claims [https://perma.cc/V836-WGH7] (last visited Nov. 9, 2018) (specify-
ing procedures for filing claims with TSA); see also Complaint, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.tsa.gov/contact-center/form/complaints [https://perma.cc/7T2H-
V3QR] (last visited Nov. 9, 2018) (providing forms for filling out complaints with
TSA).
9. See TSA Tort Claim Package, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/sites/
default/files/sf95cover_packagerevised07-08-15-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC98-
4X85] (last visited Nov. 9, 2018) (providing that if claim is denied, passenger can
file suit in appropriate United States district court).
10. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 168 (noting plaintiffs may sue TSOs for certain
intentional torts under Federal Tort Claims Act).  Importantly, a suit under the
Federal Tort Claims Act is the sole remedy in federal court for torts committed by
TSOs. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2018).  Although under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics an individual may sue federal employees
in their individual capacity for constitutional violations if the court finds an im-
plied right of action, the Third Circuit has held that there is not an implied right
of action under Bivens for alleged constitutional violations by TSOs. See Vander-
klok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 199, 208–09 (denying plaintiff’s Bivens claim
for First Amendment retaliation by TSO); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389–97 (1971) (holding Fourth
Amendment violations by federal agent acting under color of his authority gives
rise to cause of action for damages).  For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s
decision in Vanderklok, see infra notes 79–86 and accompanying text.
11. See Nicholas Henes, Liability and Consent of the United States to Be Sued-Torts
in General: The United States Supreme Court Interprets the Federal Tort Claim Act’s Law
Enforcement Proviso, 89 N.D. L. REV. 341, 343 (2013) (discussing United States’ gen-
eral immunity in state and federal court when Congress has not chosen to waive
such immunity).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018) (listing exceptions to Federal Tort Claims
Act); see also Henes, supra note 11, at 343 (discussing United States’ waiver of sover-
eign immunity under FTCA).
13. See § 2680(h); see also Henes, supra note 11, at 349 (noting that exception
is known as “law enforcement proviso”).
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In Pellegrino, the Third Circuit held that TSOs are “investigative or law
enforcement officers” under the law enforcement proviso of the FTCA.14
Specifically, Pellegrino waives the United States’ sovereign immunity from
any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
abuse of process, or malicious prosecution when committed by a TSO.15
Accordingly, the United States can be sued when TSOs commit those spe-
cific intentional torts listed in the FTCA.16
This Note argues that in Pellegrino, the Third Circuit correctly inter-
preted the FTCA in holding that the law enforcement proviso is not lim-
ited only to criminal law enforcement officers and instead applies to TSOs
as well.17  The plain text of the FTCA defines an investigative or law en-
forcement officer as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by
law to execute searches.”18  Therefore, because TSOs are officers who are
empowered to execute searches, other circuit courts should follow the
Third Circuit’s lead and read the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso as en-
compassing TSOs.19  Part II of this Note provides background information
about the history of the TSA and FTCA, as well as relevant case law inter-
preting the FTCA.20  Part III summarizes the procedural history and facts
14. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision in Pellegrino, see
infra notes 103–28 and accompanying text.
15. For further analysis of the impact of the Third Circuit’s decision in Pelle-
grino, see infra notes 183–90 and accompanying text.
16. See Pellegrino v. United States Transp. Sec. Admin., Div. of Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 937 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding Ms. Pellegrino’s claims
against TSOs may proceed because United States waived its sovereign immunity).
17. For an argument in favor of the law enforcement proviso applying to
TSOs, see infra notes 139–56 and accompanying text.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018) (defining law enforcement or investigative
officer under FTCA) (emphasis added); see also infra notes 139–56 and accompany-
ing text (discussing arguments in favor of FTCA applying to TSOs).
19. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 168 (holding TSOs can be sued under FTCA’s
law enforcement proviso); see also § 2680(h) (waiving United States’ sovereign im-
munity will allow plaintiffs to bring claims alleging assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution); see also infra notes
30–36 and accompanying text (describing searches TSOs perform).  TSOs are em-
powered to conduct “screening[s] of all passengers and property.” See 49 U.S.C.
§ 44901(a) (2018) (describing screenings of passengers and property).  Under the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), TSOs are designated as “em-
ployees.” See id. (“[T]he screening shall take place before boarding and shall be
carried out by a Federal Government employee.”).  The TSA administrator “may
designate an employee of the Transportation Security Administration or other
Federal agency to serve as a law enforcement officer.” See 49 U.S.C. § 114(p)(1)
(2018).  Only when employees are designated as “officers” may they “carry a fire-
arm,” “make an arrest,” and “seek and execute warrants.” See § 114(p)(2)(a)-(c).
Although TSOs are classified as “employees” under the ATSA, in 2005 their job
classification title changed from “screener” to “transportation security officer.” See
Transportation Security Officers have Renewed Focus and New Look on Seventh Anniversary
of 9/11, supra note 5. Moreover, TSO’s wear officer uniforms and badges. See id.
20. For a detailed discussion of the creation of the TSA, see infra notes 28–35
and accompanying text.  For a detailed discussion of the passage of the FTCA, see
infra notes 36–47 and accompanying text.  For a detailed discussion of the defini-
4
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of Pellegrino.21  Part IV examines the court’s reasoning in deciding Pelle-
grino.22  Part V includes a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s decision in
Pellegrino, identifies how it is consistent with the Supreme Court’s defini-
tion of a search, and offers other possible solutions to hold TSOs account-
able for the improper searches they perform such as changing TSA
policies and using social media to ignite change.23  Finally, Part VI dis-
cusses the impact of Pellegrino.24
II. BREAKING FREE: TENSIONS BETWEEN THE NEED FOR SECURITY
AND THE GOVERNMENT’S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Every day approximately 2,587,000 passengers fly in and out of air-
ports throughout the United States.25  In order to fly, passengers must
adhere to the TSA’s security procedures, which include walking through
metal detectors and, in some instances, full physical pat down searches.26
While airport searches are constitutional, as explained below, passengers
sometimes feel as though officers perform them inappropriately.27
A. The Creation of the TSA
To understand how the court in Pellegrino concluded that individuals
who experience inappropriately performed TSA searches have the right to
sue under the FTCA, it is necessary to look at why Congress created the
TSA.28  In response to the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, President George W. Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA) on November of the same year, creating the TSA
tion of a search, see infra notes 38–65 and accompanying text.  For recent court
cases interpreting the FTCA, see infra notes 66–86 and accompanying text.
21. For the discussion of the facts and procedural history of Pellegrino, see
infra notes 87–102 and accompanying text.
22. For a complete narrative analysis of the Third Circuit’s decision in Pelle-
grino, see infra notes 103–38 and accompanying text.
23. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s decision in Pellegrino and a
discussion of solutions that could hold TSOs more accountable for the searches
they perform, see infra notes 139–82 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the potential impacts of Pellegrino on individuals sub-
ject to TSO searches while traveling in airports, see infra notes 183–90 and accom-
panying text.
25. See Air Traffic by the Numbers, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/
air_traffic/by_the_numbers/ [https://perma.cc/2N52-W2H6] (last visited Nov.
11, 2018) (providing statistics for air travel throughout United States).
26. See Security Screening, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/se
curity-screening [https://perma.cc/PWT2-XEY5] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (dis-
cussing current security measures employed throughout airports, including walk
through metal detectors and physical pat downs, which are in place to prevent
prohibited items and other threats to security from entering certain areas of
airports).
27. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing instances where TSOs
have reportedly performed searches inappropriately).
28. For a discussion of the creation of the TSA, see infra notes 28–35 and
accompanying text.
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within the United States Department of Transportation.29  When passing
the ATSA, President Bush emphasized the importance of ensuring that
the airways are safe for travel.30  Today, the TSA seeks to strengthen trans-
portation systems, “while ensuring the freedom of movement for people
and commerce.”31
Under the ATSA, TSOs are designated as “employees” who “shall pro-
vide for the screening of all passengers and property.”32  To accomplish its
goals of increased airport security, the TSA enacted a variety of measures,
including full physical pat downs of certain individuals by TSOs.33  A pat
down consists of a thorough inspection of the entire body, including sensi-
tive areas.34  A TSO will perform a pat down either when a passenger sets
29. See Daniel S. Harawa, The Post-TSA Airport: A Constitution Free Zone?, 41
PEPP. L. REV. 1, 12 (2013) (providing background information on creation of
TSA).  The TSA now falls under the authority of the Department of Homeland
Security. See id. at 12 n.62 (describing how in March 2003 TSA was transferred to
Department of Homeland Security); see also Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, PUB. L. NO. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (presenting statutory text creating
TSA); 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2018) (providing text of Aviation and Transportation Se-
curity Act).
30. See Harawa, supra note 29 at 13 (explaining reasons behind President
Bush’s creation of TSA).  While signing the ATSA, President Bush said the new
security measures were “permanent and aggressive” steps to improve airport secur-
ity. See id. at 12 (quoting Transcription of President Bush’s Speech During Signing of
Aviation Security Bill, Text: President Bush Signs Aviation Security Bill, THE WASH. POST
(Nov. 19, 2001), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/at-
tacked/transcripts/bushtext_111901.html [https://perma.cc/5PT2-8S2C] (pro-
viding transcript of President Bush’s speech before signing ATSA into law)).
31. See Mission, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mission
[https://perma.cc/FE4R-ER39] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (providing TSA’s mis-
sion statement, which includes overview of its vision, core values, workforce expec-
tations, and history).
32. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a) (2018) (defining duties of TSOs).  Although
TSOs were originally called TSA “screeners,” the TSA changed the name in Octo-
ber 2005 to “transportation security officer.” See Transportation Security Officers Have
Renewed Focus and New Look on Seventh Anniversary of 9/11, supra note 5.  Distinct
from TSOs, the ATSA also allows the TSA administrator to designate an employee
as a “law enforcement officer” who is allowed to carry a firearm, make arrests, and
seek and execute warrants. See § 114(p)(1)-(2).
33. See Katherine A. Lowe, Safety in the Sky: Will Reforming and Restructuring the
TSA Improve Our Security or Merrily Infringe on Our Rights?, 81 J. AIR L. & COM. 291,
294 (2016) (explaining various security measures implemented by TSA).  The vari-
ous security measures implemented by the TSA include: hand searches of baggage,
pat down searches of individuals, governmental-issued identification check points
for passengers, walk through metal detectors for passengers, and a limit of one
carry-on item and one personal item per passenger. See id. (describing methods
used by TSA to increase security in airports after September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks).
34. See Security Screening, supra note 26 (providing details as to what individuals
may expect when TSOs conducts pat down searches).  The TSA states:
A pat-down may include inspection of the head, neck, arms, torso, legs,
and feet.  This includes head coverings and sensitive areas such as breasts,
groin, and the buttocks.  You may be required to adjust clothing during
the pat-down.  The officer will advise you of the procedure to help you
6
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off the screening technology alarm or a passenger chooses it as an alterna-
tive form of screening.35
B. Sovereign Immunity and the Creation of the FTCA
Since the ratification of the United States Constitution, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity has helped shield the United States from legal lia-
bility.36  Specifically, sovereign immunity prevents potential plaintiffs from
suing the United States and its employees in state or federal courts.37  Nev-
ertheless, a federal court may allow a plaintiff to bring a Bivens claim to sue
a federal employee if the employee violated the United States Constitution
while acting under the color of federal authority.38  Also, Congress can
anticipate any actions before you feel them.  Pat-downs require sufficient
pressure to ensure detection, and areas may undergo a pat-down more
than once for the TSA officer to confirm no threat items are detected.
Id. (explaining TSOs use back of their hands when touching sensitive areas of
body).  An additional screening, however, may be necessary to eliminate the possi-
bility of a threat, which involves a TSO patting down a sensitive area with the front
of the hand. See id. (describing that in limited cases TSOs use front of hands on
sensitive area during pat down searches).
35. See id. (providing information on why TSOs use pat down screenings).  A
TSO of the same gender as the subject of the search conducts the pat down screen-
ing. See id. (offering details of what to expect when TSOs conduct pat downs).
36. See Henes, supra note 11 at 344 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,
205 (1882)) (describing history behind sovereign immunity and how the US inher-
ited the doctrine from England).
37. See id. at 343 n.11 (providing that “[i]t is unquestioned that the Federal
Government retains its own immunity from suit not only in state tribunals but also
in its own courts” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999))); see also 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS § 1.01 (2019) (explaining that prior to the enactment of FTCA there
were virtually no judicial remedies for “those who suffer[ed] injury or damage as a
result of the negligence or misconduct of employees of the United States
Government”).
38. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389–97 (1971) (holding federal agents violating Fourth Amendment
while acting under color of their authority gives rise to cause of action for dam-
ages); see also Bivens Actions, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
bivens_actions [https://perma.cc/58R4-D58B] (last visited Sept. 7, 2018) (describ-
ing how individuals bring Bivens claims).  A Bivens claim requires a constitutional
injury for which damages are an appropriate remedy. See Jordan M. Emily, The
Essence of Civil Liberty: Legitimacy and Judicial Oversight for the Targeted Killing of an
American Citizen Through the Bivens Claim, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 887, 896 (2017)
(describing requirements for Bivens claims).  To decide whether damages are an
appropriate remedy, courts apply a two-part test: “(1) no alternative remedy is
available for the plaintiff and (2) no special factors counsel hesitation in granting
relief.” See id. (discussing elements courts consider when deciding Bivens claims).
The Supreme Court infrequently extends Bivens claims to new contexts. See id. at
908 n.96 (noting that Supreme Court rarely extends Bivens claims beyond Fourth
Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment).
7
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waive the United States’ sovereign immunity and provide the terms under
which a party can sue the United States or its employees.39
In 1946, responding to a dramatic increase in the size of the federal
government, Congress passed the FTCA.40  The FTCA sought to eliminate
the time-consuming usage of private bills—individual bills brought di-
rectly to Congress—which was one of the only ways an individual citizen
could bring a claim against the United States for tortious conduct of gov-
ernment employees when acting within the scope of their employment.41
In creating the FTCA, Congress sought “to establish a uniform remedy
and fair compensation for tort victims, while freeing itself from the heavy
burden of private relief legislation.”42  The FTCA waives the United States’
sovereign immunity and gives the federal district courts jurisdiction over
claims against the United States when the claimant alleges “injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment.”43  A suit against the United States
under the FTCA is thus the only judicial remedy for unconstitutional torts
committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their
employment.44
39. See Henes, supra note 11, at 343 (citing Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d
794, 797 (8th Cir. 2011)) (describing waivers of sovereign immunity).
40. See id. at 348 (describing that Congress passed FTCA as part of its Legisla-
tive Reorganization Act of 1946).  The size of the government increased as a result
of the Great Depression, World War II, and general Roosevelt era reforms, which
contributed to Congress’s passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act. See id.
(citing David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 375, 378 (2011)) (describing circumstances leading to
enactment of Legislative Reorganization Act).
41. See Fuller, supra note 40 at 378 (describing why Congress enacted FTCA).
Before the enactment of the FTCA, individual citizens had to bring “private bills”
against the United States for tortious actions of government employees, which was
considered a time-consuming and clumsy process.  See id.  “A private bill deals with
one or more named individuals or entities, often providing benefits in response to
a specific request in an area such as immigration or private claims.” Id.  Individu-
als brought their private bills directly to Congress, and their claims were rarely
successful. See  Hervey A. Hotchkiss, An Overview of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 33
A.F. L. REV. 51, 51 (1990) (explaining history of FTCA).
42. See Hotchkiss, supra note 41, at 51 (describing why Congress enacted
FTCA).  “Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946 as a waiver
of sovereign immunity permitting a limited but meaningful financial remedy for
persons injured by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of federal employees
acting within the scope of their employment.” Id. (footnote omitted) (detailing
FTCA’s purpose).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2018) (providing language of FTCA).  The
FTCA states that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction “under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” See
id. (providing FTCA’s terms).
44. See § 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1) (2018) (explaining FTCA is the sole remedy
for torts committed by federal employees).
8
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The FTCA contains various exceptions, such as the intentional tort
exception, which reasserts the United States’ sovereign immunity for cer-
tain intentional torts committed by governmental employees.45  Impor-
tantly, the FTCA’s “law enforcement proviso” serves as an exception to
intentional torts exception and waives the United States’ sovereign immu-
nity for certain intentional torts when committed by “investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States.”46  The FTCA defines an inves-
tigative or law enforcement officer as “any officer of the United States who
is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make
arrests for violations of Federal law.”47
C. Definition of a Search
1. Definition of a Search as Defined Under the Fourth Amendment
Whether TSOs fit under the law enforcement proviso depends on
whether they conduct searches, seize evidence, or make arrests.48  Because
TSOs do not seize evidence or make arrests, the only way they could qual-
The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and
2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for
money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the em-
ployee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of
such employee.
Id.  “If the United States is sued in tort, or once the United States substitutes itself
as a defendant in a tort case, the FTCA provides the exclusive avenue to relief, if
any can be had.” See Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citing § 2679(b)(1)).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018) (providing language for intentional tort
exception of FTCA).  The intentional tort exception reasserts the United States’
liability for claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. See id. (naming intentional torts cov-
ered by intentional tort exception).  It also reasserts sovereign immunity for libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights. See id.
(listing intentional torts covered by FTCA’s intentional tort exception).
46. See id. (waiving United States’ sovereign immunity “with regard to acts or
omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Govern-
ment . . . to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso,
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or mali-
cious prosecution”); see also Fuller, supra note 40, at 377–79 (providing back-
ground information on creation of FTCA).  The FTCA did not always include the
law enforcement proviso. See id. at 385 (explaining Congress amended FTCA in
1974 to include law enforcement proviso in response to abuses by law enforcement
officers).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018) (providing definition of “investigative or
law enforcement officer” under FTCA).
48. See Henes, supra note 11, at 354 (noting officers who are granted a waiver
of sovereign immunity under law enforcement proviso must be empowered to con-
duct searches, seize evidence, or make arrests).
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ify for the law enforcement proviso is by virtue of executing searches.49
Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals are protected “against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.”50
The Supreme Court has stated that the right of people to be “free
from all restraint or interference of others” is one of the most sacred
rights.51  Under the Fourth Amendment, a search takes place “when the
government violates a subjective expectation that society recognizes as rea-
sonable.”52  In Terry v. Ohio,53 the Supreme Court held that a search oc-
curs when an officer takes ahold of an individual and pats down the outer
surfaces of his or her clothing.54  To comply with the Fourth Amendment,
a search must be “reasonable.”55  Although the Supreme Court has stated
49. See TSA Myth Buster: Do TSA Officers Arrest Passengers?, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.
(July 3, 2016), https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2016/07/03/tsa-myth-busters-do-tsa-of-
ficers-arrest-passengers [https://perma.cc/9FPC-W84R] (discussing how TSOs do
not have authority to arrest passengers but may call for law enforcement assistance
when necessary).
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing text of Fourth Amendment).  The
Fourth Amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
See id.  In evaluating Fourth Amendment claims, courts conduct a three-part test,
which includes: (1) determining whether the government performed a search, (2)
evaluating whether the search was legal, and (3) deciding the proper remedy if the
search was illegal. See Bryan D. Lammon, The Practical Mandates of the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Behavioral Argument for the Exclusionary Rule and Warrant Preference, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1101, 1104–05 (2007) (explaining Fourth Amendment requirements).
51. See Terry v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 1 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bot-
sford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)) (stressing importance of Fourth Amendment).
52. See Lammon, supra note 50, at 1105 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 33 (2001)) (explaining searches under Fourth Amendment).
53. 393 U.S. 1 (1968).
54. See id. at 16–19 (explaining search occurred under Fourth Amendment
when officer took ahold of defendant and “patted down the outer surfaces of his
clothing”).  In Terry, the Court also rejected the notion that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not apply unless the officer performs an arrest or a “full-blown search.”
See id. at 19.  Thus, the Court concluded that a search occurred because the officer
took ahold of the defendant and patted him down. See id.
55. See id. at 19 (noting courts must look at whether search was reasonable).
The Court in Terry concluded that the officer “had reasonable grounds to believe
that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection
of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutral-
ize the threat of harm if it materialized.” See id. at 30.  The Court went on to state
that:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual con-
duct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the en-
counter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety,
10
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that an officer should generally obtain a warrant based on probable cause
before it searches an individual, the Court has considered many excep-
tions to this requirement that allow searches to occur without a warrant or
probable cause.56  Moreover, the Supreme Court has reiterated that there
is not one specific definition to decide whether a search is reasonable, but
instead it often uses a balancing test weighing “the need to search (or
seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails” to deter-
mine if a search is reasonable.57
2. Definition of an Administrative Search
Distinct from searches under the Fourth Amendment, administrative
searches do not require probable cause or search warrants.58  Thousands
of administrative searches occur all around the country every day.59  When
evaluating whether an administrative search is permissible, courts conduct
a balancing test and weigh the government’s interest in performing the
search against the individual’s interest in maintaining privacy.60
The administrative search doctrine has been used to justify searches
at airports.61  Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to con-
duct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any
weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the per-
son from whom they were taken.
Id. at 30–31.
56. See Lammon, supra note 50 at 1109 (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387
U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967)) (stating how officers should generally obtain warrants
before conducting searches).  Despite this preference, there are many exceptions
to the warrant requirement, including those that occur under exigent circum-
stance. See id.  Exigent circumstances exist when an officer pursues a fleeing felon,
fears the destruction of evidence, must prevent a suspect’s escape, or believes there
is a risk of danger to third parties. See id. (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
100 (1990)).  Consequently, “[a]s long as the government is reasonably pursuing a
legitimate government interest, the warrant and probable cause requirements reg-
ularly fade away.” See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 254, 255 (2011) (explaining various exceptions to warrant and
probable cause requirement).
57. See Terry, 393 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534–37)) (describing
Fourth Amendment balancing test).
58. See Primus, supra note 56, at 255–57 (describing how administrative
searches differ from searches under Fourth Amendment).
59. See id. (noting prevalence of administrative searches in United States).
Administrative searches include searches and screenings that occur at sobriety
checkpoints, international boarders, airports, government buildings, and public
schools. See id.
60. See id. at 256–57 (describing test courts use to determine whether adminis-
trative searches are reasonable).  This balancing test is “very deferential to the gov-
ernment,” and thus most administrative searches are found to be reasonable. See
id.
61. See id. at 259 (noting government’s reliance on administrative search doc-
trine to justify airport screenings).
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on the constitutionality of airport searches, it stated in dicta that the
searches are reasonable because without them the risk to public safety is
substantial.62  Moreover, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Hartwell,63
held that searches at airports are justified by the administrative search doc-
trine, which permits suspicionless checkpoint searches when there is “a
favorable balance between ‘the gravity of the public concerns served by
the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest,
and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.’”64  Applying
this test, the Third Circuit found that airport searches do not violate the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures because the state has a great
interest in maintaining air travel safety, the search procedures are tailored
to achieve that interest, and the searches are minimally invasive.65
D. Courts Interpret the FTCA
Courts have encountered various cases involving the FTCA
and its law enforcement proviso.66  For example, in Millbrook v. United
62. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (stating that “[w]e reiter-
ate, too, that where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspi-
cionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example,
searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other official build-
ings”); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 33 (2000) (holding
Court’s decision “does not affect the validity of border searches or searches in
airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure
public safety can be particularly acute”).
63. 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006).
64. See id. at 178–79 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004))
(describing when courts apply the administrative search doctrine).
65. See id. at 181 (holding that TSA’s search of defendant at airport was justi-
fied by administrative search doctrine).  Under the Fourth Amendment, searches
must be reasonable, which ordinarily requires individualized suspicion of a wrong-
doing. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (emphasizing searches of individuals are ordina-
rily unreasonable absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing).  The Supreme
Court, however, has held that administrative searches which seek to serve “special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” do not require individual-
ized suspicion to be considered reasonable. See id. (describing administrative
search doctrine).  Therefore, in Hartwell, the Third Circuit categorized airport
searches as administrative searches and thus found them reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment absent individualized suspicion. See Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 178
(categorizing airport searches as administrative searches).
66. See Campos v. United States, 888 F.3d 724, 737 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding
law enforcement proviso did not allow alien’s suit to proceed against United States
Customs and Boarder Protection officer because officer’s conduct did not sink to
necessary level).  “The law enforcement proviso . . . only applies in situations in
which the kinds of egregious, intentional misconduct occurs that was present in
the events that prompted Congress to adopt the proviso . . . .” Id. at 736.  The Fifth
Circuit noted that since 1987, it has applied the law enforcement proviso with
great caution. See id. (explaining that law enforcement proviso applies only in lim-
ited circumstances where there is “egregious, intentional misconduct”); see also
Moore v. United States, 213 F.3d 705, 710–13 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding postal
inspectors fall within law enforcement proviso because they investigate criminal
matters, but federal prosecutors do not fall within proviso); Nurse v. United States,
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss4/5
2019] NOTE 641
States,67 the Supreme Court interpreted the law enforcement proviso
broadly based on its plain text and held that its waiver of sovereign immu-
nity extended to all acts or omissions of law enforcement officers that arise
during the scope of their employment regardless of whether the act or
omission occurred during a search, seizure, or arrest.68  The Supreme
Court thus abrogated the Third Circuit’s decision in Pooler v. United
States,69 which narrowed the law enforcement proviso’s scope by reading it
as only applying if the tortious conduct committed by the officer occurred
during a search, seizure, or arrest.70
The Third Circuit has also considered whether FTCA’s law enforce-
ment proviso applies to administrative agencies.71  Specifically, in Matsko
v. United States,72 the Third Circuit relied heavily on Pooler when it held
that the law enforcement proviso did not apply to a Mine Safety and
Health Administration inspector whose tortious conduct occurred outside
the scope of the inspector’s employment.73  Although the Third Circuit
decided Matsko before the Supreme Court’s decision in Millbrook, the
226 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that United States Customs Service
agents fell within law enforcement proviso).
67. 569 U.S. 50 (2013).
68. See id. at 55–56 (“[T]here is no basis for concluding that a law enforce-
ment officer’s intentional tort must occur in the course of executing a search,
seizing evidence, or making an arrest in order to subject the United States to liabil-
ity.”).  In Millbrook, the Court had to decide whether a correctional officer’s con-
duct at a prison fit within the law enforcement proviso of the FTCA. See id. at 54.
In this case, a correctional officer sexually abused a prisoner and the federal gov-
ernment argued the law enforcement proviso did not extend to the prisoner’s
claims. See id. at 53.  The federal government’s argument relied on the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Pooler v. United States, which interpreted the proviso as applying
only to conduct occurring during the execution of a search, seizure, or arrest. See
id. (detailing the government’s argument). See Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d
868, 872 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding law enforcement proviso applies only to tortious
conduct that occurred during searches, seizures, or arrests).
69. 787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1986).
70. See Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 55–57 (“[T]he waiver effected by the law enforce-
ment proviso extends to acts or omissions of law enforcement officers that arise
within the scope of their employment, regardless of whether the officers are en-
gaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are executing a search, seiz-
ing evidence, or making an arrest.”).  The Supreme Court noted that other circuit
courts have incorrectly “read into the text additional limitations designed to nar-
row the scope of the law enforcement proviso.” See id. at 55 (citing Pooler, 787 F.2d
at 872).
71. See Matsko v. United States, 372 F.3d 556, 560 (3d Cir. 2004) (considering
whether law enforcement proviso applies to Mine Safety and Health Administra-
tion inspector).
72. 372 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004).
73. See id. at 560 (reasoning that although inspector had authority to inspect
mines and investigate possible violations, employees of administrative agencies do
not fall within law enforcement proviso because they are not law enforcement of-
ficers).  The court in Matsko relied on Pooler when it stated that “the FTCA did not
intend to bring within its scope actions by ‘officers’ not within the bounds of an
investigation.” See id.  The court then concluded that the mine inspector was not
acting within the scope of his employment when he assaulted the plaintiff. See id.
13
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Third Circuit noted that it did not need to consider the correctness of
Pooler’s narrow reading of the proviso because administrative agencies, re-
gardless of the investigations they conduct, are not covered by law enforce-
ment proviso.74
Faced squarely with the issue of whether the FTCA’s law enforcement
proviso applies to TSOs, the Eleventh Circuit in Corbett v. Transportation
Security Administration,75 an unpublished decision, concluded that the pro-
viso did not apply to TSOs.76  The Eleventh Circuit did not consider
whether TSOs perform searches, and instead concluded that they simply
are not “officers” under the proviso.77  In holding that TSOs are federal
employees and not officers, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the distinction
of the words “officer” and “employee” under the FTCA and the different
use of the terms in statutes governing airport security.78
Although not involving a claim under the FTCA, in Vanderklok v.
United States,79 the Third Circuit considered and ultimately denied a plain-
tiff’s Bivens claim alleging First Amendment retaliation by a TSO.80  The
court began its inquiry into whether a Bivens claim existed by explaining
that recognizing a cause of action under a constitutional amendment is
context-specific and thus the court must look at the issue in the particular
context of airport security as it relates to the specific defendant, an airport
screener.81  First, the court looked to see whether alternative or existing
Therefore, it held that the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso did not provide a
waiver of sovereign immunity. See id.
74. See id. (“We need not determine whether Pooler’s narrow reading was mis-
taken, because employees of administrative agencies, no matter what investigative
conduct they are involved in, do not come within the § 2680(h) exception.”).
75. 568 F. App’x 690 (11th Cir. 2014).
76. See id. at 701 (holding FTCA’s law enforcement proviso does not apply to
TSOs).
77. See id. (noting that “[w]e need not resolve this thorny ‘search’ issue” be-
cause “TSA screeners are not subject to the law enforcement proviso for a simpler
reason—they are not ‘officers of the United States Government,’ as required
by § 2680(h)‘s statutory language.”).
78. See id. (explaining how FTCA and federal statutes governing airport secur-
ity differentiate between officers and employees).
79. 868 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2017).
80. See id. at 199, 208–09 (denying plaintiff’s Bivens claim for First Amend-
ment retaliation by TSOs).  “[A]ctions brought directly under the Constitution
against federal official have become known as ‘Bivens actions.’” Id. at 198 (noting
that federal courts’ authority to imply new constitutional torts, which are not ex-
pressly authorized by statute, is rarely invoked); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389–97 (1971) (holding
violation of Fourth Amendment by federal agent acting under color of his author-
ity gives rise to cause of action for damages).
81. See Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 199–200 (“It is not enough to argue . . . that
First Amendment retaliation claims have been permitted under Bivens before.  We
must look at the issue anew in this particular context, airport security, and as it
pertains to this particular category of defendants, TSA screeners.”).  The Vander-
klok court explained that courts no longer imply rights and remedies under Bivens
as a matter of course. See id. at 200.  Instead, the court must first ask “whether any
14
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processes existed for the plaintiff to exercise his First Amendment right to
free speech without retaliation by TSOs.82  The court found no alterna-
tives existed because the TSO did not fall within the law enforcement pro-
viso and thus could not be sued under the FTCA and the plaintiff never
asserted that the officer acted outside the scope of his employment.83
Next, the Vanderklok court looked to see if there were special factors
counseling against creating a new cause of action under Bivens.84  The
court found that there were several factors to consider in the realm of
airport security, such as the importance of securing the nation’s airports
and air traffic, a reluctance for judicial intervention into matters involving
foreign policy and security, a hesitancy to overstep Congress’s power in
assigning liability, and a practical concern in fashioning a court-made rem-
edy for TSA employees.85  These factors led the Vanderklok court to hold
that Bivens does not offer a remedy against TSOs who retaliate against pas-
sengers that exercise their First Amendment rights, but left the specific
issue of whether TSOs fall under the FTCA open to interpretation.86
alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing
reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding
remedy in damages.” See id. (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007)).
Next, the court stated that “even in the absence of an alternative, . . . ‘[we] must
make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law
tribunal, paying particular heed . . . to any special factors counselling hesitation
before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.” See id.
82. See id. at 200 (describing that in analyzing Bivens claims, courts first look
to see whether alternative or existing processes exist that are capable of protecting
constitutional issues at stake).
83. See id. at 200–04 (“In summary, then, there can be a remedy against the
United States in cases where the employee had the responsibility of an officer, and
there can be a state law remedy against the individual when the offending TSA
employee acted outside the scope of employment.”).  The Third Circuit looked at
the district court’s prior orders and concluded that “there are no alternative judi-
cial remedies available to [the traveler], because the District Court concluded that
[the TSO] was not an investigative or law enforcement officer and there was no
challenge as to whether [the TSO] acted within the scope of his employment.” See
id. at 204.  The Third Circuit noted that there is a possible non-judicial remedy in
the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), which is administered by the TSA
and allows travelers to fill out an online complaint about their grievances. See id. at
204–05.  Despite this option, the court noted that TRIP is primarily designed for
those challenging their inclusion on terrorism watch lists and was not an adequate
remedy for the plaintiff in this case. See id. at 205.
84. See id. at 205–06 (“In determining whether to imply a Bivens claim for First
Amendment retaliation by TSA screeners, we must ask whether there are special
factors counseling hesitation.”).
85. See id. at 206–09 (“[T]he role of the TSA in securing public safety is so
significant that we ought not create a damages remedy in this context.”).
86. See id. at 199 (acknowledging that there may be no other alternative reme-
dies available other than Bivens action for plaintiff).  In Vanderklok, the Third Cir-
cuit stated that the district court’s decision that the law enforcement proviso does
not apply to TSOs was not on appeal. See id. at 203.
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III. DON’T EVER STOP, BOP TO THE TOP: FROM THE DISTRICT COURT,
TO THE THIRD CIRCUIT, AND TO THE THIRD CIRCUIT AGAIN,
THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
OF PELLEGRINO
In Pellegrino, the Third Circuit found itself confronted with the issue it
left open in Vanderklok: interpreting the law enforcement proviso as it ap-
plies to TSOs.87  Nadine Pellegrino and her husband went to the Philadel-
phia Airport to travel home to Florida.88  At the airport, Ms. Pellegrino
passed through a TSA security checkpoint.89  After passing through the
metal detector, a TSO randomly selected Ms. Pellegrino for an additional
search and began to examine her luggage.90
After being selected, Ms. Pellegrino requested that she be searched in
a more discreet manner, the TSO obliged and several TSOs searched
through her luggage in a private room.91  Ms. Pellegrino found the search
of her luggage to be unnecessarily rough and voiced concerns to the
TSOs, informing them that she planned to report their conduct to TSA
authorities.92  As Ms. Pellegrino repacked her bag, one TSO claimed she
struck her with it.93  At one point while the TSOs forced Ms. Pellegrino to
repack her bags, a TSO allegedly blocked Ms. Pellegrino’s access to her
bags causing her to crawl under a table to reach them.94
87. See Pellegrino v. United States Transp. Sec. Admin, Div. of Dep’t of Home-
land Sec., 937 F.3d 164, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining court is faced with
question of whether TSOs are “investigative or law enforcement officers” under
FTCA).
88. See id. at 168 (examining facts that led to TSOs searching Ms. Pellegrino).
89. See id. (describing how Congress created TSA after terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 and that TSA requires TSOs to perform screenings of passengers
at airports).
90. See id. (explaining how TSO randomly selected Ms. Pellegrino for further
screening).
91. See id. (describing scene while Ms. Pellegrino was in private screening
room).  In the private room, one TSO “allegedly counted [Ms. Pellegrino’s] coins
and currency, examined her cell phone data, read the front and back of her mem-
bership and credit cards, and opened and smelled her cosmetics, mints, and hand
sanitizer.” See id. (explaining what occurred during Ms. Pellegrino’s search).
92. See id. (detailing search of Ms. Pellegrino that occurred in private screen-
ing room).  The TSO searched her credit cards, money, cell phone, and makeup.
See id. (describing how Ms. Pellegrino found this search to be unnecessarily
rough).  Ms. Pellegrino claimed the TSOs spilled the contents that were in various
containers and damaged her jewelry and eyeglasses. See id. (explaining how TSOs
damaged Ms. Pellegrino’s property including her jewelry and eyeglasses).  The
TSOs then left Ms. Pellegrino to clean up the mess herself. See id. (explaining how
it took Ms. Pellegrino several trips to clean up TSO’s mess).
93. See id. (describing TSO’s allegation that Ms. Pellegrino struck her with her
bag).
94. See id. (explaining what occurred when TSOs forced Ms. Pellegrino to
repack her bags).  When Ms. Pellegrino crawled under the table to retrieve her
bag, one TSO claimed the table tipped over and struck the TSO in the leg. See id.
(explaining what happened to Ms. Pellegrino after search ended).
16
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Based on the TSO’s allegations, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s
Office filed ten charges against Ms. Pellegrino.95  At the preliminary hear-
ing, the judge dismissed many of the charges and the district attorney
dropped others.96  Nothing resulted from remaining charges against Ms.
Pellegrino because the TSA failed to provide surveillance video of the inci-
dent, one TSO never appeared in court, and another TSO offered testi-
mony that was self-contradictory.97
Ms. Pellegrino eventually sought a remedy for the incident that oc-
curred at the airport and filed a civil action against the TSA in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging nu-
merous constitutional and statutory claims.98  The district court narrowed
the claims down to a property damage claim, claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under the FTCA, and a Bivens
cause of action for violations of the First and Fourth Amendments.99  The
parties settled the property damage claim, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of the TSA on the FTCA claims on the ground that
TSOs are not covered under the law enforcement proviso, and the court
also granted summary judgment on the Bivens claim.100  On appeal, a di-
vided Third Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s decision in full.101
The Third Circuit then granted rehearing en banc to reconsider the ques-
tion of whether TSOs are “investigative or law enforcement officer[s]” as
defined under the FTCA.102
IV. WHAT I’VE BEEN LOOKING FOR: THE PELLEGRINO COURT HOLDS
THAT TRAVELERS MAY SUE TSOS FOR CERTAIN
WRONGFUL CONDUCT
In Pellegrino, the Third Circuit addressed whether TSOs qualify as “in-
vestigative or law enforcement officers” under the FTCA.103  If so, the
95. See id. at 168–69 (explaining that Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office
charged Ms. Pellegrino with ten crimes, including aggravated assault, possession of
instruments of crime, and making terroristic threats).
96. See id. (explaining what happened during preliminary hearing).
97. See id. (detailing how none of the claims against Ms. Pellegrino rose to
guilty verdict).
98. See id. at 169 (listing various claims Ms. Pellegrino brought against TSA
and several TSOs).
99. See id. (describing district court’s decision).
100. See id. (explaining district court ruled that TSOs are not covered by
FTCA’s law enforcement proviso).  After finding the FTCA’s language ambiguous,
the district court determined the statute’s legislative history indicated that it was
not intended to cover TSOs. See Pellegrino v. United States Transp. Sec. Admin.,
No. CIV.A. 09-5505, 2014 WL 1489939, at *5–8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2014) (explain-
ing district court’s dismissal of Ms. Pellegrino’s claims).
101. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 169 (explaining Third Circuit’s divided deci-
sion); see also Pellegrino v. United States Transp. Sec. Admin., Div. of Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 896 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming district court in full).
102. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 169 (stating procedural posture of case).
103. See id. (describing issue on appeal).
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court would allow Ms. Pellegrino’s intentional tort claims to proceed.104
Tackling this issue of first impression among the Third Circuit, the court
analyzed the law enforcement proviso by looking to its plain language and
separated its opinion into four main questions: “[a]re TSOs (1) officers of
the United States who are (2) empowered by law to (3) execute searches
for (4) violations of federal law?”105  Judge Krause, joined by three Third
Circuit judges, dissented, and found that the law enforcement proviso
does not extend to TSOs.106
A. The Plain Text of the Law Enforcement Proviso
Looking to the text of the law enforcement proviso, the court first
determined that TSOs fit within the definition of officers of the United
States.107  The court reasoned that TSOs serve in positions of trust and
authority, assist in critical aspects of national security, perform the screen-
ings of passengers, and secure the nation’s airports.108  The court recog-
nized that the ATSA created the position of “law enforcement officer[s],”
who are individuals who make arrests and carry firearms at airports, who
are distinct from TSOs, which the ATSA designates as “employees.”109  De-
spite this distinction, the court held that both could qualify as officers
under the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso.110  Furthermore, the court
explained that even if there existed “uncertainty about the reach of the
104. See id. at 168 (explaining that because Ms. Pellegrino’s claims involved
intentional torts allegedly committed by TSOs, she could only bring these claims
against United States if she could show United States waived its sovereign immu-
nity).  The Third Circuit recognized that the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for
certain intentional torts committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers.”
See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018)).  The court noted that “[i]f a federal
official fits this definition, plaintiffs may sue for certain intentional torts.” See id.
(describing how federal government waives immunity for certain torts committed
by its employees).
105. See id. at 170 (describing how to analyze FTCA’s law enforcement pro-
viso) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See id. at 181 (Krause, J., dissenting) (finding law enforcement proviso
does not apply to TSOs).  Judge Jordan, Judge Hardiman, and Judge Scirica also
joined in Judge Krause’s dissent. See id.
107. See id. at 170 (relying on dictionary definitions to determine word’s us-
age).  The court noted that an officer is defined as one who “‘serve[s] in a position
of trust’ or ‘authority,’ especially as ‘provided for by law.’” See id. (quoting Officer,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971)).
108. See id. (explaining why TSOs are officers).  The court noted that TSO’s
perform the screening of all passengers, protect travelers from threats to public
safety, and wear uniforms with badges that say “officer.” See id. (emphasizing rea-
sons why TSOs are considered officers).
109. See id. at 170–71 (explaining differences between “law enforcement of-
ficers” and TSOs under ATSA).  The court noted that under the ATSA, TSOs tech-
nically are employees. See id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a) (2018)).
110. See id. (imparting ATSA’s definition of “employee” and “officer” onto
FTCA would lead to confusion).
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term ‘officer of the United States,’ it would be resolved in favor of a broad
scope.”111
Next, looking to whether TSOs are “empowered by law,” the court
answered in the affirmative.112  Looking at the statutory authority of TSOs,
the court concluded they are empowered to conduct screenings of passen-
gers and property at airports.113  Accordingly, TSOs are empowered by law
within the meaning of the law enforcement proviso.114
The court then addressed whether TSOs execute searches.115  The
court first stated that TSOs perform searches under the dictionary defini-
tion of a “search.”116  Specifically, they perform examinations and inspec-
tions of individuals at airports.117  Additionally, the court briefly
mentioned how TSO screenings are searches within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.118  TSO screenings also meet the definition of a
search announced in Terry because TSO screenings require a “careful ex-
ploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her
body in an attempt to find weapons.”119  The court emphasized that the
screenings performed by TSOs are more intimate than other administra-
tive inspections, affect the public directly, and involve physical, and often
intrusive, examinations of a person’s physical body.120
111. See id. at 171–72 (noting that “the statutory reference to ‘any officer’—as
opposed to, say, criminal officer—supports an expansive reading”  of the proviso).
112. See id. at 172 (noting that “empowered by law” limits the scope of officers
covered under law enforcement proviso).
113. See id. (citing § 44901(a)) (noting TSOs are empowered to screen “all
passengers and property”).
114. See id. (recognizing TSOs are empowered by law under FTCA’s law en-
forcement proviso).
115. See id. (noting TSO screenings are searches under term’s ordinary mean-
ing, under Fourth Amendment, and under Court’s definition in Terry).
116. See id. (explaining dictionary definition of search).  The definition of a
search includes “to examine (a person) thoroughly to check on whatever articles
are carried or concealed.” See id. (quoting Search, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY (1971).
117. See id. at 172–73 (explaining how TSOs perform searches at airports).
The court also noted that “[d]ictionaries aside, one could simply ask any passenger
at any airport” about whether TSOs search them. See id. at 172.  Additionally, the
TSOs who screened Ms. Pellegrino referred to their procedure as a search. See id.
(citing incident report).
118. See id. at 173 (recognizing that TSO screenings fall within searches under
Fourth Amendment).  Although the government argued that passengers’ consent
to the searches cancels out the Fourth Amendment effect, the Third Circuit stated
“the presence or absence of consent does not determine whether a search has
occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” See id. (explaining Fourth
Amendment argument).  The court additionally made clear that airport screen-
ings are not consensual because a passenger who does not consent to a search
cannot board any flight. See id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1544.201(c); § 1540.107(a)).
119. See id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)) (emphasizing that
TSA screenings fall with Terry’s definition of search).
120. See id. at 174–77 (recognizing that “TSO screenings often involve invasive
examinations of the physical person”).  The Third Circuit emphasized that the
physical nature of TSA screenings distinguish them from other administrative
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Answering its fourth question, the court found that TSOs execute
searches for violations of federal law.121  The court acknowledged that it
does not mention the law enforcement proviso’s legislative history in its
analysis because the text is clear.122  It recognized that Congress could
have limited the law enforcement proviso to include only criminal law en-
forcement offices by inserting the word “criminal” into the proviso, but it
did not.123  Because the court answered each of its initial questions in the
affirmative, it concluded that TSOs fit within the proviso.124
After determining that TSOs do fit within the law enforcement pro-
viso, the court considered the consequences of its decision.125  Impor-
tantly, if TSOs are not covered under the law enforcement proviso, then
plaintiffs like Ms. Pellegrino are left with no judicial redress.126  The court
clarified that its ruling does not hold that every administrative search falls
under the law enforcement proviso.127  Instead, it explicitly made clear
that TSO searches are distinct from other administrative searches because
“[t]hey extend to the general public and involve searches of an individ-
ual’s physical person and her property.”128
searches. See id. at 176 (comparing TSA screenings to other types of administrative
searches).  For example, the court contrasted an inspector of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration, who simply inspects mines, from TSA screeners, who per-
form intimate physical searches of individuals’ bodies. See id. (citing Matsko v.
United States, 372 F.3d 556, 560 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Moreover, the court stated that
“[t]o the extent Matsko can be read to hold that mine safety inspectors are outside
the proviso simply because they are administrative agency employees, it is no
longer valid.” See id.
121. See id. at 177 (“TSOs search for weapons and explosives, and carrying
them on board an aircraft is a criminal offense.”).  The court consulted various
statutes that provide criminal penalties for carrying weapons onboard flights and
listed the hazardous materials that are not allowed on planes. See id. (citing 29
U.S.C. § 46505; 49 C.F.R. §§ 172.202, 175.10(a)).
122. See id. at 179 (noting that when statutes are clearly written, courts do not
have to consult their legislative history).
123. See id. at 179–80 (explaining that “Congress has created a remedy; we are
simply giving effect to the plain meaning of its words”).
124. See id. at 180 (holding that TSOs fall within FTCA’s law enforcement
proviso).
125. See id. (“Before concluding, we note the implications of the choice
before us.”).
126. See id. (citing Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 209 (3d Cir.
2017)) (“TSOs are not susceptible to an implied right of action under Bivens for
alleged constitutional violations . . . so a Tort Claims Act action is the only remain-
ing route to recovery.”).  “Without recourse under that Act, plaintiffs like Pelle-
grino will have no remedy when TSOs assault them, wrongfully detain them, or
even fabricate criminal charges against them.” See id.
127. See id. (distinguishing TSO searches from other administrative searches).
128. See id. (acknowledging how TSO screenings differ from other types of
inspections).  Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision
as it pertained to the interpretation of the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso. See id.
(affirming the district court’s decision in all other respects).
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B. Judge Cheryl Ann Krause’s Dissent
In contrast to the majority opinion, Judge Krause in her dissent would
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ms. Pellegrino’s FTCA claims be-
cause TSOs are not covered under the law enforcement proviso.129  Judge
Krause opined that the law enforcement proviso refers solely “to officers
empowered to exercise traditional police powers.”130  Her dissent criti-
cized the majority for dissecting the law enforcement proviso into pieces
instead of reading the words together as Congress intended it to be
read.131
Based on the plain text of the law enforcement proviso, Judge Krause
found that the exception to sovereign immunity applies only when crimi-
nal law enforcement officers commit the tortious conduct.132  Judge
Krause noted that other sections of the FTCA distinguish between officers
and employees, yet the law enforcement proviso applies only to officers.133
Therefore, Congress intended for there to be a difference between an em-
ployee, such as a TSO, and an officer.134  Judge Krause determined that
although the majority emphasized that its expansion of the law enforce-
129. See id. at 181 (Krause, J., dissenting) (arguing plain text of law enforce-
ment proviso must be read to exclude TSOs).
130. See id. (Krause, J., dissenting) (arguing law enforcement proviso does not
apply to “administrative searches for programmatic purposes”).
131. See id. (Krause, J., dissenting) (“That breathtaking expansion of the pro-
viso is textually unsound, departs from other circuits, and contravenes the rule that
waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the
Government.”).
132. See id. at 181 (Krause, J., dissenting) (noting that when analyzing mean-
ing of statutes, courts must look to plain text of statute).  The dissent noted that
the plain language of the law enforcement proviso excludes administrative employ-
ees, like TSOs, because they are not “empowered by law to execute searches, to
seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law” and they are not
considered “officer[s] of the United States.” See id. at 182 (Krause, J., dissenting)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018)).  With this language, Congress intended for
the proviso to apply only to investigatory searches, not to administrative searches.
See id. at 185 (Krause, J., dissenting).  The dissent explained that when the phrase
“execute searches” appears in any statute in the United States Code, it is referring
to investigatory searches. See id. at 185 (Krause, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2231(a); § 2234; § 3109; 22 U.S.C. § 2709(a)(2)).  Moreover, the dissent stressed
that the phrase “violation of Federal law” only refers to criminal law because that
phrase modifies “make arrests,” and arrest can only be made when one violates a
criminal law. See id. at 186 (Krause, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 189–90 (Krause, J., dissenting) (explaining that terms such as
“officer” and “employee” should not be conflated).  “Instead of conflating ‘officer’
with ‘employee,’ [Judge Krause] read Congress’s markedly different language in
the very same statutory section to signal an intent to limit the proviso to a specific
class of federal government personnel: those ‘charged with police duties.’” See id.
at 190 (Krause, J., dissenting) (quoting Officer, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DIC-
TIONARY 797 (1976)).
134. See id. at 190 (Krause, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress’s use of differ-
ent language signals its intent to limit the law enforcement proviso to those who
possess police powers).
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ment proviso applies only to TSOs, the majority instead waives sovereign
immunity for all employees who conduct administrative searches.135
Finally, Judge Krause argued that the majority’s decision “marks a dra-
matic departure” from the Third Circuit’s precedent and that of other
circuit courts.136  She noted that “[we] should not be creating this circuit
split, much less putting ourselves on the wrong side of it.”137  Judge Krause
concluded by noting that courts must construe waivers of sovereign immu-
nity narrowly in favor of the United States and Congress could expand the
law enforcement proviso to expand the United States’ sovereign immunity
if it wishes.138
135. See id. at 195–96 (Krause, J., dissenting) (discussing that although major-
ity attempted to narrow its decision, it offers no principled reason for limiting its
reading to physical searches).  “Without a limiting principle, the Majority’s inter-
pretation of the law enforcement proviso works a staggering expansion of the Gov-
ernment’s waiver of sovereign immunity.” See id. at 196 (Krause, J., dissenting).
Because many administrative agencies and their employees perform “searches” as
defined under the Fourth Amendment, this will result in the waiver of sovereign
immunity. See id. at 196–97 (Krause, J., dissenting) (noting that Secretary of Com-
merce inspects books, Food and Drug Administration inspectors examine meat
products, and Environmental Protection Agency employees inspect areas with haz-
ardous waste).
136. See id. at 197–98 (Krause, J., dissenting) (discussing various cases that
disagree with majority’s opinion).  For example, in Matsko, the Third Circuit held
that Mine Safety and Health Administration inspectors are not covered under the
law enforcement proviso. See id. at 197–98 (Krause, J., dissenting) (citing Matsko v.
United States, 372 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004)).  The dissent noted the Matsko court’s
reasoning that mine inspectors do not fall within the proviso because they are
“employees of administrative agencies” and not investigate or law enforcement of-
ficers. See id. at 197–98 (Krause, J., dissenting) (citing Matsko, 372 F.3d 556, 560).
Also, the dissent referenced Corbett v. TSA, where the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether TSA screeners were covered under the law enforcement proviso and
found that they are not because they are employees and not officers. See id. at 198
(Krause, J., dissenting) (citing Corbett v. TSA, 568 F. App’x 690, 701 (11th Cir.
2014).  Judge Krause found further support in other circuit courts for a limited
application of the law enforcement proviso. See id. at 198 (Krause, J., dissenting)
(citing Moore v. United States, 213 F.3d 705, 708–20 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (holding
proviso applies to postal inspectors who are empowered to investigate criminal
matters); Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
proviso applies to custom officers); Celestine v. United States, 841 F.2d 851,
852–53 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding proviso applies to Veterans’ Administration police
officers); Hoston v. Silbert, 681 F.2d 876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding proviso
applies to United States Marshalls); Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1234
(2d Cir. 1982) (holding proviso applies to Immigration and Naturalization Service
agents); Brown v. United States, 653 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding proviso
applies to Federal Bureau of Investigation agents); Hernandez v. Lattimore, 612
F.2d 61, 64 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding proviso applies to federal correctional
officers)).
137. See id. at 199 (Krause, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Courts of Appeals have con-
sistently interpreted the proviso to distinguish between federal officers involved in
traditional law enforcement and federal employees who are not.”).
138. See id. at 199 (Krause, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress has power to
expand FTCA’s law enforcement proviso, but courts do not).
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V. STICK WITH THE STATUS QUO: TSOS SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE
UNDER THE FTCA’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISO
Despite the dissent’s contention that the majority’s decision is “on the
wrong side of” a circuit split, the Third Circuit decided Pellegrino correctly
and TSOs should be held accountable under the FTCA because they exe-
cute searches for violations of federal law under the law enforcement pro-
viso.139  Looking at the plain text of the Supreme Court’s definition of a
“search” outlined in Terry, a search occurs when an officer pats down the
outer surfaces of one’s clothing.140  TSOs regularly pat down the outer
surfaces of passengers’ clothing.141  By concluding that TSOs execute
searches, the Third Circuit is holding TSOs accountable for when they
commit a wrongdoing, while simultaneously upholding a traveler’s right to
a meaningful remedy.142  Other circuit courts who are faced with inter-
preting the law enforcement proviso as it relates to TSOs should follow the
Third Circuit’s decision and find that TSOs are not absolutely immune
from suit.143  If other circuit courts are unwilling to recognize that TSOs
fall under the law enforcement proviso, as the dissent argued they should,
then the TSA itself must step in to offer adequate remedies for
passengers.144
139. See id. (Krause, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that majority’s decision goes
against other circuit court decisions); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018) (looking
at plain language of FTCA, to qualify for law enforcement proviso, “law enforce-
ment or investigative officer” is defined as “any officer of the United States who is
empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for
violations of Federal law”). But see Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 168 (“Because TSOs are
‘officer[s] of the United States’ empowered to ‘execute searches’ for ‘violations of
Federal law,’ Pellegrino’s lawsuit may proceed.”).
140. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (defining search under Fourth
Amendment); see also Henes, supra note 11 at 355 (stating Supreme Court has
practice of reading statutory waivers of sovereign immunity strictly, using plain text
approach); see also Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 173–74 (“TSA screenings even meet the
definition of the particular subset of Fourth Amendment searches announced
in Terry just six years before the enactment of the proviso.”).
141. See Security Screening, supra note 26 (providing information as to when
TSOs pat down passengers and how they do it).
142. See Jonathan Stempel, Fliers Can Sue over Airport Screener Abuses: U.S. Ap-
peals Court, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2019, 11:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-tsa-lawsuit/fliers-can-sue-over-airport-screener-abuses-u-s-appeals-court-idUS
KCN1VK201 [https://perma.cc/N2HA-P4ZG] (discussing implications of Third
Circuit’s decision in Pellegrino).  Ms. Pellegrino’s lawyer stated that, “If you think
you are a victim of intentional misconduct by TSA agents, you can now have your
day in court.” See id.  Her lawyer also noted that “[Ms. Pellegrino] never gave up,
and it is a real tribute to her courage.” See id.
143. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 168 (“Because TSOs are ‘officer[s] of the
United States’ empowered to ‘execute searches’ for ‘violations of Federal law,’ Pel-
legrino’s lawsuit may proceed.”).
144. See id. at 199 (Krause, J., dissenting) (noting that other courts of appeals
have and should continue to interpret law enforcement proviso as applying to fed-
eral officers who perform traditional law enforcement functions and not federal
employees who are not involved in those functions).
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A. TSOs Execute Searches
In Pellegrino, the court looked to the plain text of the law enforcement
proviso to conclude that it applies to TSOs.145  When the text of a statute
is unambiguous, the court need only look at its plain language.146  The
law enforcement proviso is unambiguous because it clearly defines who
qualifies as a law enforcement or investigative officer.147  Therefore, the
court need only look to its plain text.148
Also, the Supreme Court has practiced strict adherence to the plain
text approach of interpreting the law enforcement proviso.149  Impor-
tantly, in Millbrook, the Supreme Court emphasized that it must interpret
the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso according to its plain text.150  It
found that the lower courts, including the Third Circuit, had previously
read the law enforcement proviso too narrowly, contrary to its plain
text.151  Therefore, the Court held that the lower courts erred when they
limited the law enforcement proviso by adding terms to it, which the text
itself never used.152
145. See supra, notes 103–28 and accompanying text (explaining majority’s
reasoning in Pellegrino).
146. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 179–80 (“Here, Congress has created a remedy;
we are simply giving effect to the plain meaning of its words.”).
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018) (defining investigative or law enforce-
ment as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law”); see
also Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 179–80 (noting that “words matter” and Congress
could have inserted “criminal” into the law enforcement proviso but did not).
148. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 179 (citing Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d
233, 244 (3d Cir. 2009)) (noting Third Circuit does not look at legislative history
when statute’s text is clear).
149. See Henes, supra note 11 at 355 (discussing Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of law enforcement proviso); see, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359
(2005) (explaining that when statute’s language is plain, Court must enforce it
according to its text); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A waiver of the
Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in
statutory text.”).
150. See Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50, 55 (2013) (interpreting law
enforcement proviso according to its plain text).  The Supreme Court noted that
in Pooler, the Third Circuit read into the law enforcement proviso too narrowly in
holding that it only applied when officers committed tortious conduct while “exe-
cuting a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.” See id. at 56 (quoting
Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 872 (1986)).  The Court held that the Third
Circuit’s interpretation did not find any support in the text of the law enforcement
proviso. See id. (“The FTCA’s only reference to ‘searches,’ ‘seiz[ures of] evidence,’
and ‘arrests’ is found in the statutory definition of ‘investigative or law enforce-
ment officer.’” (citing § 2680(h))).
151. See id. (“A number of lower courts have nevertheless read into the text
additional limitations designed to narrow the scope of the law enforcement
proviso.”).
152. See id. at 57 (holding FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for inten-
tional torts committed by law enforcement officer was not limited to investigative
activities, abrogating Pooler).  “Had Congress intended to further narrow the scope
of the proviso, Congress could have limited it to claims arising from ‘acts or omis-
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The plain text of the FTCA’s law enforcement proviso indicates a “law
enforcement or investigative officer” is defined as “any officer of the
United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evi-
dence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.”153  In Terry, the
Supreme Court specifically held a search occurred when an officer patted
down the outer surfaces of an individual’s clothing, which is precisely what
TSOs do to passengers during a pat down search.154  Moreover, TSOs per-
form these searches for violations of federal law when they search for
items that passengers are forbidden to take on an aircraft.155  Therefore,
the only way TSOs could be removed from the ambit of the proviso is if a
court reads the term “criminal” into the law enforcement proviso, which
the Supreme Court in Millbrook forbade.156
B. Consequences of Holding TSOs Accountable
If TSOs are held accountable for their misconduct under the FTCA,
those who are injured by TSOs during searches will have a real legal rem-
edy.157  Furthermore, other agencies’ employees will not automatically be
included under the proviso as the dissent in Pellegrino predicted.158  Al-
though the dissent in Pellegrino acknowledged the limited legal redress its
decision leaves for those harmed by TSOs’ intentional torts, the judges
seemed more concerned with the possibility of opening the floodgates of
litigation if TSOs are held accountable under the law enforcement pro-
viso.159  However, the majority made clear that its decision applies only to
TSOs because the searches they perform are more intimate and physical
sions of investigative or law enforcement officers acting in a law enforcement or inves-
tigative capacity.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214, 227 (2008)).
153. See § 2680(h) (providing text of law enforcement proviso).
154. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (holding search occurred when
officer patted down outer clothing of defendants); see also Security Screening, supra
note 26 (explaining that TSOs regularly pat down outer surfaces of passengers’
clothing).
155. See Pellegrino v. United States Transp. Sec. Admin., Div. of Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 937 F.3d 164, 177 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 46505 (2018))
(arguing TSOs perform searches for violations of federal law because searches are
directed to certain illegal and prohibited items).
156. See Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 57 (holding that if Congress intended to narrow
scope of law enforcement proviso, it could have done so); see also Pellegrino, 937
F.3d at 179 (“Congress could have chosen to insert ‘criminal’ into the proviso.”).
157. See Stempel, supra note 142 (discussing how after Pellegrino, travelers who
are victims of TSA misconduct can now have their day in court).
158. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 195–97 (Krause, J., dissenting) (describing how
majority’s expansion of FTCA’s law enforcement proviso will result in waiver of
sovereign immunity for all employees who perform administrative searches).
159. See id. at 196 (Krause, J., dissenting) (“Without a limiting principle, the
Majority’s interpretation of the law enforcement proviso works a staggering expan-
sion of the Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity.”).
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than traditional administrative searches.160  Despite this limitation, the dis-
sent still expressed fear that the Department of Defense, which inspects
defense contractors, the Food and Drug Administration, which examines
food products, and numerous other federal employees who perform in-
spections would then fall under the exception.161
Despite this fear, the Third Circuit holding that the law enforcement
proviso applies to TSOs does not mean that the proviso automatically ap-
plies to food inspectors and officers of other administrative agencies.162
Instead, courts will have to look at these other administrative agencies on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether they fit within the proviso—the
court would need to determine whether they “execute searches” as de-
fined in Terry.163  It is extremely unlikely that a court would find that Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees—which the dissent cited
as potentially falling under the law enforcement proviso if extended to
TSOs—execute searches.164  The “searches” EPA employees perform, un-
like the searches TSOs perform, are in no way analogous to how the Su-
preme Court defined what constituted a search in Terry.165  Therefore, the
160. See id. at 180 (detailing that TSO screenings fall under FTCA’s law en-
forcement proviso because “they are more personal than traditional administrative
inspections”).
161. See id. at 196–97 (Krause, J., dissenting) (finding that expanding law en-
forcement proviso to TSOs would unprecedentedly expand United States’ tort lia-
bility to other federal government employees who perform searches).
162. See id. at 180 (explaining issue in Pellegrino involved only whether law
enforcement proviso applied to TSOs and not whether it applied to other adminis-
trative agencies).
163. See Henes, supra note 11, at 354 (arguing Supreme Court will likely have
to determine who fits under the law enforcement proviso on a case-by-case basis).
164. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 196–97 (Krause, J., dissenting) (asserting that to
allow TSOs to fall under the law enforcement proviso could lead to Environmental
Protection Agency employees and other administrative employees to also fall
under the proviso).  “[T]he EPA surveys hazardous waste sites.” Id. at 197 (Krause,
J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a)) (listing powers of EPA employees to
inspect hazardous waste sites)).
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (2018) (explaining how EPA employees are au-
thorized to inspect hazardous waste).  EPA employees conduct inspections of facili-
ties for the purpose of determining who is in compliance with environmental
regulations, which may require an employee to take physical samples of waste, but
never requires them to physically touch or search a person. See id. (stating EPA
employees may enter areas where hazardous waste is located and may obtain sam-
ples of such waste); see also How We Monitor Compliance, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/compliance/how-we-monitor-compliance [https://perma
.cc/5HDD-EQ7F] (last visited Sept. 13, 2018) (specifying that on-site visits by EPA
employees may include: “interviewing facility or site representatives . . . reviewing
records and reports . . . taking photographs . . . collecting samples, and observing
facility or site operations”).  Looking at their specified duties, EPA employees, as
well as some of the other administrative agency employees the dissent cited, do not
conduct searches within the meaning of the law enforcement proviso because they
lack the authority to physically pat down the outer surfaces of an individual’s cloth-
ing. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (finding search occurred when officer
patted down outer surface of individual’s clothing).  The dissent in Pellegrino ex-
pressed fear that expanding the law enforcement proviso to TSOs would necessa-
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majority’s holding that the law enforcement proviso applies to TSOs does
not lead to the conclusion that every administrative search falls under the
proviso as the dissenters in Pellegrino fear.166
C. If Other Circuits Do Not Follow the Third Circuit’s Interpretation of the
Law Enforcement Proviso, TSOs Still Must Be Held
Accountable for Misconduct
If the other circuit courts are unwilling to hold TSOs accountable
under the FTCA, as the dissent argued they should, alternative solutions
must be implemented to ensure passengers feel safe in airports.167  Be-
cause flying is a nearly inescapable method of travel, individuals should be
comforted by the fact that TSOs will face civil consequences if they im-
properly perform a search.168  If other circuit courts disagree with the ma-
jority’s holding in Pellegrino, the TSA itself can implement more stringent
requirements for its searches then to hold TSOs responsible for miscon-
duct.169  Alternatively, if this does not occur, then individuals should con-
tinue to use social media as an outlet to express their outrage of TSA
abuses to incentivize the courts to act.170
rily expand it to a host of other federal agencies including the Department of
Defense, the Food and Drug Administration, and the EPA. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d
at 196–97 (Krause, J., dissenting) (describing effects of expanding law enforce-
ment proviso to TSOs).  However, the Department of Defense inspects contract
records. See 10 U.S.C § 2313 (2018) (listing powers agency has to inspect records).
FDA inspectors inspect various food products, such as meats and certain fishes. See
21 U.S.C. § 606 (2018) (describing FDA’s inspection and labeling procedures).
Clearly, neither of these types of inspections fit within Terry’s definition of a search.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 (holding officer searched the individual “when he took
hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing”).  Moreover, the
majority in Pellegrino clarified that TSO searches are different than those per-
formed by other administrative agencies because they are more personal, extend
to the general public, and involve intimate searches of a person’s physical body
and property. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 180.  Additionally, the majority in Pellegrino
points out that the risk of abuse for those who undergo a TSO screening is greater
than for other administrative searches. See id. at 178.  Highlighting this difference,
the majority noted that “[t]here is a reason that FDA meat inspectors do not gen-
erate headlines about sexual assault and other intimate violations.” See id.
166. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 180 (“Nor is our ruling meant to draw every
administrative search into the ambit of the proviso.”).
167. See supra, note 6 and accompanying text (explaining how intrusive TSOs
often make individuals feel scared to travel); see also Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 197–99
(Krause, J., dissenting) (noting majority’s decision is on wrong side of circuit split).
168. See Stempel, supra note 142 (describing Pellegrino as “a victory to travelers
who object to invasive screenings at U.S. airport security checkpoints”).
169. See infra, notes 171–76 and accompanying text (providing discussion of
how TSA can hold its TSOs accountable for civil misconduct); see also Pellegrino, 937
F.3d at 180–81 (holding TSO screenings are covered under FTCA’s law enforce-
ment proviso).
170. See infra, notes 177–82 and accompanying text (detailing how travelers
can hold TSOs accountable for civil misconduct).
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1. The TSA Must Step in
Although the TSA allows passengers to file a complaint or claim di-
rectly with the TSA, this is not always a sufficient remedy.171  To address
the issue of TSO misconduct and to be more transparent with travelers,
the TSA should give travelers the option to request that TSOs record
searches that occur in private rooms and that the recording of the search
be saved for a certain amount of time.172  This procedure can be used to
promote trust between the traveler and the TSO.173  It can be accom-
plished most easily if TSOs are required to wear body cameras or if the
private screening room has a video camera.174  Then, the TSOs would be
171. See Claims, supra note 8 (detailing how passengers file claims with TSA);
see also Complaint, supra note 8 (explaining procedures for filling out complaints
with TSA).  The TSA, however, notes that “[t]he Federal Tort Claims Act governs
the way your claim is processed and establishes your rights in regard to your
claim.” See Claims, supra note 8 (detailing what occurs when claims are submitted
to TSA).  Consequently, after Pellegrino, if circuits remain split on whether the law
enforcement proviso applies to TSOs, then passengers may have little legal redress
under the FTCA if they are not in the Third Circuit. See Pellegrino v. United States
Transp. Sec. Admin., Div. of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 937 F.3d 164, 198 (3d Cir.
2019) (Krause, J., dissenting) (“A unanimous panel of the Eleventh Circuit
squarely rejected the Majority’s interpretation in a persuasive and well-reasoned,
albeit non-precedential, opinion.”) (citing Corbett v. TSA, 568 F. App’x 690 (11th
Cir. 2014) (per curiam)).
172. See Ronnie Polanesczy, Passenger Turns Down Oatmeal, Airline Summons
TSA: More Tales of Airport-Security Abuse, THE PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 3, 2019, 5:00
AM), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/columnists/ronnie_polaneczky/arrested-
at-airport-tsa-abuse-body-camera-bodycam-aclu-philadelphia-20180803.html
[https://perma.cc/2HD6-4VNZ] (discussing that body camera “[p]rovides a neu-
tral ‘third party’ witness to encounters between the passengers and [airport] law
enforcement”).  Congressman Adriano Espaillat introduced a similar bill into the
United States House of Representatives during the 2017-2018 term which would
require U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) to wear body cameras. See H.R. 1608, 115th Congress
(2017).  Known as the “ICE and CBP Body Camera Accountability Act,” it would
require ICE and CBP agents and officers to turn on body cameras at the beginning
of their shifts, allow each party in any administrative proceeding, civil action, or
criminal prosecution to obtain the footage, and provide sanctions for officers who
do not turn on their body cameras. See id.
173. See Amanda Ripley, A Big Test of Police Cameras Defies Expectations, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/upshot/a-big-test-
of-police-body-cameras-defies-expectations.html [https://perma.cc/CBF2-NH3L]
(describing effects body cameras have had on police officers in Washington, D.C.).
In Washington, D.C., a study of the effects of police body cameras found that “the
effects [of using body cameras] were too small to be statistically significant.” See id.
(describing “[o]fficers with cameras used force and faced civilian complaints at
about the same rates as officers without cameras”).  The cameras are still useful,
because “[e]ven if cameras do not reduce violent encounters, they can still offer
other kinds of benefits: for training, or to hold a rogue officer accountable after
the fact.” See id. (describing benefits of police cameras).
174. See Martin Kaste, New Orleans’ Police Use of Body Cameras Bring Benefits and
New Burdens, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, INC. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections
/alltechconsidered/2017/03/03/517930343/new-orleans-police-use-of-body-cam
eras-brings-benefits-and-new-burdens [https://perma.cc/JFA3-PKZT] (describing
effects of New Orleans’ policy of requiring police officers to wear body cameras).
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required to turn on the camera at the request of the traveler.175  This gives
the traveler the option of declining to be videotaped if they find the video-
tape to be more invasive to their privacy rights than the search itself.176
2. Using Social Media to Ignite Change
If other circuit courts refuse to follow the Third Circuit’s holding,
which provides remedies to innocent travelers who face misconduct from
TSOs, then individuals must stand up and voice their concerns.177  Con-
gress passed the law enforcement proviso in response to a public outcry
against law enforcement’s abuses after police officers conducted unconsti-
tutional raids throughout the early 1970s.178  Therefore, individuals
While wearing body cameras, New Orleans’ police officers cannot escape punish-
ment for some of the illegal practices that they used to be able get away with when
they did not wear cameras. See id. (“Busting into people’s houses, going into peo-
ple’s cars, just coming up to people and searching them with impunity, and we just
aren’t seeing as much of that.”).  Implementing body cameras, however, may be a
costly endeavor. See id. (explaining costs of body cameras and how reviewing the
footage can be time-consuming).
175. See Radley Balko, A New Report Shows the Limits of Police Body Cameras, THE
WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/
wp/2016/02/05/a-new-report-shows-the-limits-of-police-body-cameras/ [https://
perma.cc/5ZRJ-CV7F] (noting tradeoffs between privacy and accountability with
body cameras).
176. See Maya Wiley, Body Cameras Help Everyone—Including the Police, TIME
(May 9, 2017), https://time.com/4771417/jordan-edwards-body-cameras-police/
[https://perma.cc/XL2F-7AKF] (explaining positive effects of having police of-
ficers wear body cameras, yet noting some individuals find it infringes on privacy
rights).
Civil rights groups are right to stay vigilant about footage being recorded,
stored and utilized in a manner that respects the privacy of minors, vic-
tims of sexual assault and any person who may be recorded initially as a
subject in an incident but isn’t ultimately determined to have a role in a
crime.
Id.
177. See Pellegrino v. United States Transp. Sec. Admin., Div. of Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 937 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding FTCA’s law enforce-
ment proviso applies to TSOs); see also Norman B. Antin, Constitutional Tort Reme-
dies: A Proposed Amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 12 CONN. L. REV. 492, 524
(1980) (“[I]t is fundamentally unfair to require innocent victims to bear the losses
inflicted upon them through government activity.”).  “[I]t is clear that increased
government responsibility for the tortious and unconstitutional acts of its employ-
ees and officials is mandated.” Id.  An “effective” remedy must accompany every
legal right. See id. (arguing that FTCA should be amended to broaden its scope to
apply to “constitutional torts”).
178. See Henes, supra note 11 at 348–49 (discussing why Congress enacted law
enforcement proviso).  The legislative history for the law enforcement proviso
mentioned raids conducted in Collinsville, Illinois by federal drug enforcement
agents (DEA). See id. at 349 (describing raids in Collinsville, Illinois).  Federal
DEA agents broke into innocent families’ homes “ransack[ed] their home,
shout[ed] obscenities and threaten[ed] their lives withe [sic] cocked guns.” See
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should continue videotaping incidents in which they suspect TSOs are
inappropriately performing searches.179  Videotaping will shed light on
the problem of not holding TSOs accountable for their civil miscon-
duct.180  The TSA has even responded to videos of TSOs’ pat downs that
have gone viral, which demonstrates the power of social media.181  Just as
those who voiced concerns over law enforcement abuses in the 1970s were
able to drive change, individuals today can urge other circuit courts to
follow the Third Circuit’s decision in Pellegrino by voicing their concerns
about TSO misconduct.182
(detailing DEA raids in Collinsville).  “[D]ozens of other mistaken, violent, often
illegal and sometimes fatal drug raids had been executed on innocent citizens
across the country by Federal, state and local narcotics agents . . . .” See id.; see also
Fuller, supra note 40 at 385 (explaining Congress amended FTCA in 1974 to add
law enforcement proviso in response to “widely publicized law enforcement
excesses”).
179. See Video of TSA Agents Searching 96-Year-Old Woman in Wheelchair Sparks
Outrage, supra note 6 (reporting daughter took video of TSOs at Dulles Airport in
Washington intensely patting down her ninety-six-year-old mother).  The TSA does
not prohibit travelers from photographing or videotaping at security checkpoints if
the screening process remains undisturbed. See Frequently Asked Questions, TRANSP.
SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/frequently-asked-questions [https://per
ma.cc/P5MJ-6QW4] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019) (noting that disturbing interfer-
ences include: “holding a recording device up to the face of a TSA officer so that
the officer is unable to see or move, refusing to assume the proper stance during
screening, blocking the movement of others through the checkpoint or refusing to
submit a recording device for screening”).
180. See id. (reporting video went viral of TSOs at Dulles Airport in Washing-
ton intensely patting down ninety-six-year-old woman in wheelchair); see also Chan,
supra note 6 (reporting video of TSOs thoroughly patting down thirteen-year-old
boy suffering from sensory processing disorder for about two minutes at Dallas
Fort Worth International Airport went viral when posed on Facebook).
181. See TSA Mythbuster: The Rest of the DFW Pat-Down Story, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/03/28/tsa-mythbuster-rest-dfw-
pat-down-story [https://perma.cc/2SRE-B5CL] (responding to video that went vi-
ral on Facebook of TSO patting down thirteen-year-old boy at Dallas Fort Worth
Airport); see also Lisa Marie Segarra, TSA Criticized for Lengths, Invasive Pat-Down of
96-Year-Old Woman in Wheelchair, FORTUNE (June 9, 2018), http://fortune.com/
2018/06/09/tsa-wheelchair-woman-pat-down/ [https://perma.cc/KH65-KEHL]
(describing TSA’s response to viral video of ninety-six-year-old woman being patted
down by TSO).  “The video of the search, posted by the woman’s daughter . . . has
already garnered nearly 9 million views on Facebook.  It’s also been shared more
than 100,000 times and has over 20,000 comments, largely with people criticizing
the way the TSA handled the pat-down.” See id.
182. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 168 (holding the FTCA’s law enforcement pro-
viso applies to TSA agents and Ms. Pellegrino’s suit can proceed); see also Fuller,
supra note 40, at 385 (explaining why Congress enacted law enforcement proviso
in response to 1970s raids).
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VI. WE’RE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER: THE IMPACT OF
HOLDING TSOS ACCOUNTABLE
On an average day, TSOs screen approximately 2.1 million passengers
and crew throughout the United States.183 Although the Third Circuit’s
decision in Pellegrino is not binding precedent on other courts of appeals,
the Newark Liberty International Airport, located in New Jersey and thus
potentially under the Third Circuit’s jurisdiction, found itself as the TSA’s
ninth highest volume airport during the 2018 spring travel season, with a
total of 1,997,744 passengers and crew members screened in one month
alone.184  Despite the majority in Pellegrino’s acknowledgment that most
TSOs “perform their jobs professionally,” its decision still affects millions
of travelers and should be affirmed by the United States Supreme Court if
the Justice Department chooses to appeal it.185
If Pellegrino comes before the Supreme Court, the Court should affirm
the Third Circuit’s decision because the lack of accountability for TSOs
makes travelers vulnerable and even fearful to travel because of the possi-
bility that TSOs will assault or falsely imprison them with no legal rem-
edy.186  Moreover, vulnerable groups, such as ethnic minorities, the
elderly, and women are highlighted throughout the news as groups sub-
jected to more invasive TSA searches than other groups.187  Certainly,
183. See TSA Screens More Than 72 Million Passengers and Crew During Record-
Breaking Spring Travel Season, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.tsa
.gov/news/releases/2018/04/23/tsa-screens-more-72-million-passengers-and-crew-
during-record-breaking [https://perma.cc/5AQG-RFD7] (detailing number of
people screened by TSOs).
184. See id. (stating 1,997,744 passengers and crew were screened at Newark
Liberty International Airport from March 15, 2018 to April 15, 2018).
185. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 168 (“As nearly all of us can attest who have
flown on an aircraft in the United States, the overwhelming majority of TSOs per-
form their jobs professionally despite far more grumbling than appreciation.”); see
also THE TIMES EDITORIAL BOARD, Editorial: TSA Screeners Shouldn’t Be Able to Harass
Passengers and Get Away with It, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www
.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-09-03/airline-passengers-tsa-screeners-court
[https://perma.cc/4UGR-KLJJ] (“If, as seems likely, the Justice Department ap-
peals this sensible decision, the Supreme Court should refuse to reverse it.”).
186. See Video of TSA Agents Searching 96-Year-Old Woman in Wheelchair Sparks
Outrage, supra note 6 (reporting that ninety-six-year-old woman said she was scared
to travel after TSO’s intensive pat down).
187. See Michael T. Luongo, Traveling While Muslim Complicates Air Travel, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/business/traveling-
while-muslim-complicates-air-travel.html [https://perma.cc/PP7D-XRSZ] (de-
scribing Muslim-American’s experience while traveling in airports).  The stigma of
“traveling while Muslim” refers to the ways that Muslim women draw the attention
of TSOs which often leads to getting “pulled aside at security check-in for secon-
dary screenings and pat-downs, [with] the examiner feeling her head through the
hijab.” See id. (detailing stigma that accompanies Muslim women when traveling in
airports).  The article describes that:
There are various ways, of course, that Muslims might draw unwanted
attention from gate agents and security officials at airports, such as when
a Middle Eastern or other foreign-sounding name might result in being
compared against no-fly lists.  But for followers of Islam who signal their
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steps need to be taken to assure that both travelers feel safe while in air-
ports, and TSOs do not take advantage of travelers when conducting
searches.188  Based on all of these concerns, other circuit courts should
adhere to the precedent set forth in Pellegrino, the Supreme Court should
affirm the Third Circuit’s decision if it reviews it, and the TSA itself should
take proactive steps to ensure searches are appropriately performed.189
Meanwhile, travelers must continue to voice their concerns about inappro-
priately performed searches and remain vigilant when undergoing a
search that seems to exceed routine procedures.190
identity through the way they dress, their clothing can sometimes feel like
a red flag.
Id.  Moreover, other ethnic minorities, such as Sikhs, who also cover their heads
with either a turban or scarf are often subjected to extra scrutiny by TSOs. See id.
(describing how Sikhs feel humiliated when traveling when forced to remove their
turbans).  Also, the elderly are often vulnerable at airports. See Video of TSA Agents
Searching 96-Year-Old Woman in Wheelchair Sparks Outrage, supra note 6 (providing
details of TSO pat down of ninety-six-year-old woman in wheelchair); Dvorak, supra
note 6 (reporting that TSO pulled aside sixty-five-year-old woman when passing
through airport scanner choked her and groped her private parts).
188. See Leah Goldman, 10 TSA Horror Stories of Pat-Downs Gone Wrong, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 22, 2010), https://www.businessinsider.com/tsa-security-horror-stor
ies-2010-11 [https://perma.cc/8A3M-K5CD] (describing inappropriately per-
formed TSA pat-downs).
189. See Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 168 (finding law enforcement proviso does cov-
ers TSOs).
190. See Security Screening, supra, note 26 (describing normal screening proce-
dures used by TSO).
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